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ETHEREUM AND THE SEC:
WHY MOST DISTRIBUTED AUTONOMOUS
ORGANIZATIONS ARE SUBJECT TO THE
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS OF
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND A
PROPOSAL FOR NEW REGULATION
by: Tiffany L. Minks*
ABSTRACT
In a world full of new technology, the risk of fraud is constantly increasing.
In the securities industry, this risk existed long before the use of technology.
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 to combat the risk of fraud and
misrepresentation in the sale of securities. By requiring full disclosure, inves-
tors have the opportunity to make informed decisions prior to investing. How-
ever, Distributed Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”), through the use of
blockchains and smart-contracts, engage in the sale of securities without fully
disclosing the risks or complying with the registration requirements of the Se-
curities Act of 1933. Compliance with the burdensome requirements of regis-
tration, however, would destroy this new technology and method of
conducting business. To avoid this set-back, Congress must amend the regis-
tration requirements to provide an exemption for DAOs. This exemption, al-
though reducing current registration burdens, must still require DAOs to
disclose certain information, thereby ensuring investors are informed prior to
investing. Furthermore, due to the unique nature of the blockchain, smart-
contract, and DAOs, Congress must impose a fiduciary duty on the creators
of DAOs to ensure compliance with the disclosure requirements. Further,
Congress should consider the allowance of burden-shifting following the ini-
tial crowdsale.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an organization that is fully controlled by its shareholders.
There are no directors, officers, or managers. Shareholders have the
power to propose projects, which they then collectively choose,
through a vote, to pursue or reject. The terms of the shareholders’
power are written into a self-executing, electronic-contract, also
known as a “smart-contract.” The contract defines, among other
things, how many shareholders must vote to approve a proposal, how
long the proposal remains open for voting, and the third-party service
provider responsible for implementing the proposal if it is approved.
Once certain terms within the contract are fulfilled, the smart-contract
automatically moves to the next step without any human input re-
quired. For example, when a proposal receives the required number of
votes, the project specifications are automatically sent to the third-
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party service provider for implementation, manufacturing, or
distribution.
Consider, however, the potential risks associated with this type of
investment. These risks include the possibility that a proposal will
never be approved, resulting in the organization never making a
profit; the risk that the proposal is written poorly, thereby preventing
the third-party service provider from properly executing the project
after approval; or the risk of a cyber-criminal hacking into the smart-
contract and stealing the organization’s funds.
Now, with this idea of smart-contracts in mind, think about the
technological changes and advances resulting from the introduction of
the first virtual currency, Bitcoin. Since the introduction of the
Bitcoin, the world has been captivated by the concept of “virtual cur-
rency.”1 The United States Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
(“FinCEN”) has defined virtual currency as “a medium of exchange
that operates like a currency in some environments, but does not have
all the attributes of real currency. In particular, virtual currency does
not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”2
Virtual currencies are created using distributed ledger technology,
which is essentially a database that can be shared across a multitude of
networks.3 Built within this database is a “blockchain,” which creates
a transaction ledger and allows a transaction to be verified by the net-
work and encrypted, thereby ensuring its legitimacy.4 In simple terms,
every transaction is recorded by taking information from the previous
block, adding it into a new block, and inserting that new block into the
chain to keep a constant and accurate record of every transaction.5
Ethereum, however, is taking the concept of virtual currency and
the blockchain to a new level. In 2014, the creators of Ethereum intro-
duced the software necessary to operate the previously discussed
smart-contracts, which are built on powerful blockchains.6 Because
smart-contracts are built on a blockchain, every transaction is con-
nected, thereby ensuring accuracy and security.
1. See Nicolas Wenker, Online Currencies, Real-World Chaos: The Struggle to
Regulate the Rise of Bitcoin, 19 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 145, 146 (2014).
2. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, DEP’T OF TREASURY, GUIDANCE: APPLICA-
TION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR
USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES I (Mar. 18, 2013); see Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay,
Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.
J. 1493, 1527 (2016) (describing virtual currency).
3. GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND
BLOCK CHAIN, REPORT, 2016, at 5 (UK).
4. Id.; Burge, supra note 2, at 1529.
5. See What is Bitcoin Mining?, BITCOINMINING.COM, https://www.bitcoinmining
.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7QQG-KTC6].
6. What is Ether, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org/ether (last visited Sept.
4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/B2HE-FGV8].
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Smart-contracts operated on the Ethereum platform are funded by
a new virtual currency called Ether.7 Although the possibilities of
smart-contracts are not yet fully known, the concept has resulted in
many successful Distributed Autonomous Organizations (“DAOs”),
and the use of the platform has surged in recent months.
Generally, DAOs have no capital when created.8 After creation,
they are funded through a trustless crowdsale.9 The crowdsale allows
the organization to raise funds online from investors around the
world, and, in return, the organization gives its members tokens.10
These tokens give the member the power to propose projects and
vote, much like a shareholder in a traditional corporation.11 Based on
the success of the organization, the tokens may increase in value, giv-
ing the token holder a share in the profits of the organization.12
Behind the still-incredible possibilities of Ethereum hide the un-
known legal implications of the decentralized platform. Along with
the well-discussed issue of regulating crypto-currencies that defy limi-
tations and function autonomously from any governmental authority,
lawmakers, lawyers, and courts must now determine the best way to
regulate DAOs.13
This Article discusses why DAOs created on the Ethereum platform
are issuers of securities and subject to regulation under the Securities
Act of 1933. This Article also describes the capabilities and benefits of
this new technology. In an effort to avoid destruction by regulation,
this Article proposes an amendment to the current registration re-
quirements. Finally, the Article provides guidance on the disclosures
that Congress should avoid, disclosures that should be required, and a
proposal that a fiduciary duty be placed on the creators of DAOs to
ensure compliance.
Part II of this Article discusses the blockchain, how it was first in-
troduced through the creation of Bitcoin, and how the technology has
expanded into smart-contracts and other areas of the financial indus-
try. Part III introduces the history of Ethereum, the smart-contract,
and Ether (“ETH”)—the cryptocurrency used to fund smart-contracts
on the Ethereum platform. Part IV discusses Distributed Autonomous
Organizations, the recent hack of “The DAO,” and the implications of
that breach. Part V explains why tokens issued by DAOs are securities
under the Securities Act of 1933, with Part VI giving a brief overview
of the current registration requirements under the Securities Act of
1933. Because the Article concludes that DAOs are issuers of securi-
7. Id.
8. See Kickstart a Project with a Trustless Crowdsale, ETHEREUM, https://www
.ethereum.org (last visited Sept. 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/M5H8-8F5U].
9. Id.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 90–94.
11. See infra text accompanying note 100.
12. See infra text accompanying note 99.
13. Wenker, supra note 1, at 147.
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ties, Part VII proposes an amendment to the current registration re-
quirements that would place a fiduciary duty on the creators of DAOs
in an effort to ensure compliance with required disclosures. Further-
more, this Part discusses disclosures Congress should avoid imposing
on DAOs, as well as disclosures that must be required. Part VIII is a
conclusion of the Article.
II. BITCOIN, THE BLOCKCHAIN, AND THE EXPANSION OF
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY
“Blockchain technology continues to redefine not only how the ex-
change sector operates, but the global financial economy as a whole.”
—Bob Greifeld, 201514
Through decentralized ledger technology, the blockchain has cre-
ated a new, exciting opportunity for the financial industry.15 The most
widely known use of blockchain technology is the Bitcoin.16 Bitcoin
was introduced in 2009 as the world’s first decentralized virtual cur-
rency, meaning that transactions involving the currency require no
middleman such as a bank.17 Bitcoin is not legally regulated or recog-
nized by any jurisdiction, although some jurisdictions have acknowl-
edged it as money.18 Bitcoin transactions are recorded on a
blockchain; however, the names of the individuals involved in the
transaction are never recorded, thereby providing full anonymity.19
As the uses of blockchain expand beyond Bitcoin, the blockchain is
proving to be beneficial in multiple industries, specifically the finan-
cial industry. For example, prior to the introduction of the blockchain,
stock exchanges required a centralized clearinghouse to process cer-
tain financial transactions.20 The use of a clearinghouse requires paper
records and reliance on an individual at a bank to ensure transactions
14. Philip Stafford, Banks and Exchanges Turn to Blockchain, FIN. TIMES (June
30, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/764aed26-198a-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480 [https:/
/perma.cc/K7SP-CYLB].
15. Id.; see Lester Coleman, How Blockchain Technology Can Benefit Many In-
dustries Beyond Finance, CRYPTOCOINS NEWS (July 3, 2016), https://www.cryptocoin-
snews.com/blockchain-technology-can-benefit-many-industries-beyond-finance/
[https://perma.cc/ZT22-RT5W] (discussing the benefits of decentralized ledger tech-
nology for other industries).
16. See GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 3, at 27.
17. Tal Yelling, Dominic Aratari, & Jose Pagliery, What is Bitcoin?, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/infographic/technology/what-is-bitcoin/ (last visited Jan. 6,
2017) [https://perma.cc/BD9M-NLEF].
18. Is Bitcoin Legal?, COINDESK, http://www.coindesk.com/information/is-bitcoin-
legal/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/VV6T-8XWQ]; see SEC v. Shavers,
No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. 2013).
19. Tal Yelling, Dominic Aratari, & Jose Pagliery, Anonymity, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/infographic/technology/what-is-bitcoin/ (last visited Jan. 6,
2017) [https://perma.cc/9J4T-HZLR] (users Wallet ID numbers are recorded in the
blockchain).
20. Stafford, supra note 14.
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are conducted timely and properly.21 This process is inefficient and
produces the potential for fraud and mistake.22 Now, the use of decen-
tralized ledger technology has eliminated the need for a centralized
authority.23 All transactions can be efficiently recorded on a
blockchain, eliminating the need for paper records and removing the
probability of human error. It is anticipated that the benefits of the
blockchain will soon branch out into other industries, including the
legal industry.24
This Article focuses on how blockchain technology has been used to
form smart-contracts, resulting in the creation of Decentralized Au-
tonomous Organizations (“DAOs”). These organizations operate with
no centralized authority—the shareholders are in complete control,
and like Bitcoin transactions, their identities remain anonymous.25
Currently, the Ethereum platform is the leading software provider us-
ing the blockchain to operate smart-contracts that govern DAOs.26
III. WHAT IS ETHEREUM?
“Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on
financial institutions serving as trusted third parties to process elec-
tronic payments.
What is needed is an electronic payment system based on crypto-
graphic proof instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to
transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted third
party.”
—Satoshi Nakamoto, 200827
Etheruem is a decentralized platform created to operate smart-con-
tracts.28 Decentralized platforms do not have a single administrator,
but instead operate on a blockchain, which is a type of distributed
ledger.29 A distributed ledger is a consensus of digital data that spread
21. See GOV’T OFFICE FOR SCI., supra note 3, at 27.
22. See id.
23. Stafford, supra note 14.
24. See generally Dennis Kennedy & Gwynne Monahan, Lawyers Get Ready,
There’s a Blockchain Coming, LAW PRACTICE TODAY (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.law
practicetoday.org/article/lawyers-blockchain/?utm_source=January17&utm_medium=
email&utm_campaign=January17LPTemail [https://perma.cc/F4N4-8NUZ].
25. See Build Unstoppable Applications, ETHEREUM, https://www.ethereum.org
(last visited Sept. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/M5H8-8F5U].
26. Glynn Bird, Block Chain Technology, Smart Contracts and Ethereum: What
Should Block Chains and Smart Contracts be Used For?, IMB (May 19, 2016), https://
developer.ibm.com/clouddataservices/2016/05/19/block-chain-technology-smart-con-
tracts-and-ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/VY8B-22DF].
27. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN,
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QX48-
VQBU]; see also Wenker, supra note 1, at 147.
28. Build Unstoppable Applications, supra note 25.
29. See id.
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across many sites, countries, and institutions.30 This means that many
high-powered computers around the world, called miners, operate the
blockchain by adding blocks of digitally stored data to the chain.31 An
example of the type of digital-data that may be included in a block is
the information from a transaction whereby Ether is transferred from
one user to another.32 After miners build digital data into the block,
the block is stored in a linear chain, hence the term “blockchain.”33
Because each block added to the chain includes information from the
previous block, the system is trustless, meaning miners will immedi-
ately become aware if other miners enter fraudulent transactions.34
Cryptography is used to ensure the security of the blockchain.35
Cryptography is a method of encoding data to ensure the prevention
of data disclosure, thereby allowing the ledger to be manipulated se-
curely and eliminating the need for a central authority.36
A. A Brief History of Ethereum
The Ethereum platform was created by Vitalik Buterin and Dr.
Gavin Wood to “enable[ ] developers to create markets, store regis-
tries of debts or promises, move funds in accordance with instructions
given long in the past (like a will or a futures contract) and many
other things that have not been invented yet, all without a middle man
or counterparty risk.”37 Buterin and Wood created the Ethereum
Foundation to handle the legal and financial issues associated with the
presale of Ether—the cryptocurrency used to fund Ethereum smart-
contracts—prior to developing the necessary software to operate the
platform or seeking developers, miners, or investors.38 The presale,
which required the use of other cryptocurrencies to purchase Ether,
was necessary for two reasons: 1) to collect money to finish develop-
ment of the network; and, 2) to ensure a single, internal cryptocur-
rency was available for use on the network to prevent the program
30. Blockchain Technology Explained, BLOCKCHAIN TECHS., http://www.block
chaintechnologies.com/blockchain-definition (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) [https://perma
.cc/6ZH9-LFKM].
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Steven Norton, CIO Explainer: What is Blockchain?, WALL ST. JOURNAL:
CIO JOURNAL (Feb. 2, 2016, 12:49 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/02/cio-ex-
plainer-what-is-blockchain/ [https://perma.cc/KAW9-ELH7]; see Yaman Akdeniz,
Cryptography & Encryption, CYBER-RIGHTS (1996), http://www.cyber-rights.org/
crypto/cryptog.htm [https://perma.cc/RMS9-JGNR].
36. Norton, supra note 35.
37. Build Unstoppable Applications, supra note 25.
38. Id.; History of Ethereum, ETHEREUM HOMESTEAD, https://ethereum-home-
stead.readthedocs.io/en/latest/introduction/history-of-ethereum.html (last visited Jan.
1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7M52-UCC5].
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from becoming bogged down by the use of multiple currencies.39 The
presale was successful, netting 31,591 bitcoins, worth over $18 million
at that time, in exchange for over 60 million Ether.40 The successful
presale established a network of individuals interested in the concept
of Ethereum and created a foundation for the success of the
organization.
Following the presale, the creators established a new organization
called “ETH DEV” to manage the further development of Ether-
eum.41 Buterin and Wood serve as two of the three directors for ETH
DEV.42 It should be noted that this structure inherently affords
Buterin and Wood a degree of centralized control, as evidenced by the
now not-so-uncommon hard forks addressed later in the Article.43
This control creates concerns about the actual level of decentralization
on the Ethereum platform.44
During the year following the successful presale, further develop-
ment and security tests were conducted on the platform. On July 30,
2015, the first version of the program launched, known as Ethereum
Frontier, and developers began writing smart-contracts.45 The second
version of the program, known as Ethereum Homestead, was
launched in March 2016.46 The Homestead version included upgrades
that removed many risks from the Ethereum homepage.47 In order to
introduce the program to non-technologically savvy users, Ethereum
began releasing the third version, called Ethereum Metropolis, in
2017;  the release was split into two parts, with Part B scheduled to
release in early 2018.48
39. Armand Tanzarian, Ethereum Raises 3,700 BTC in First 12 Hours of Ether
Presale, THE COINTELEGRAPH (July 23, 2014), https://cointelegraph.com/news/ether-
eum-raises-3700-btc-in-first-12-hours-of-ether-presale [https://perma.cc/A4M3-
9H4R].
40. History of Ethereum, supra note 38.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 110, 114–25.
44. Bitcoin Australia Team, Four Lessons to Learn from the Ethereum Hard Fork,
BITCOIN.COM.AU (Sept. 23, 2016), https://bitcoin.com.au/page/four-lessons-learn-
ethereum-hard-fork/ [https://perma.cc/Z5NC-R5W6].
45. History of Etheruem, supra note 38.
46. The Homestead Release, ETHEREUM HOMESTEAD, http://ethdocs.org/en/latest/
introduction/the-homestead-release.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
JG7Z-53WZ].
47. The Ethereum Releases of Frontier, Homestead, Metropolis and Serenity,
CRYPTOCOMPARE, https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-ethereum-re-
leases-of-frontier-homestead-metropolis-and-serenity/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/K6S6-WLX2].
48. Id.; Alyssa Hertig, Toward Metropolis: After Blockchain Repairs, Ethereum
Looks Ahead, COINDESK (Dec. 8, 2016, 7:30 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/metropo-
lis-ethereum-blockchain-attacks-look-forward/ [https://perma.cc/SVN7-EKPD]; Sim-
ple Crypto, Ethereum Metropolis Update Could be Split into 2 Forks, MEDIUM (July
14, 2017), https://medium.com/@SimpleCrypto/ethereum-metropolis-could-be-split-
into-2-forks-c4de5c7ad43e [https://perma.cc/9AD6-BBT2]; Justin Danneman, A Sim-
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B. Ether
Ether is the virtual medium of exchange used on the Ethereum plat-
form, also known as “the crypto-fuel for the Ethereum network.”49
The cryptocurrency is traded on various virtual currency exchanges
and is denominated as “ETH.”50 Both developers of applications and
miners on the network are paid in Ether.51 The most common way to
obtain Ether, other than mining, is to purchase Bitcoin on an ex-
change and trade it for Ether.52 Therefore, Ether is comparable to
stock issued to developers and miners that can be traded for other
virtual currencies on a secondary market. Tokens, which are later dis-
cussed in the Article, should not be confused with Ether.53
C. Miners: How the Blockchain is Secured
Following the launch of Ethereum Frontier, at which time smart-
contracts funded by Ether became operational, developers recognized
the need to ensure the blockchain remained secure and functional.
Virtual currency is susceptible to electronic counterfeiting, resulting in
a potential “double-spending” problem.54 “Double-spending” occurs
when a digitally signing party spends the electronic currency more
than one time, thereby causing a multitude of problems.55 Seeking to
combat this risk, miners joined the network to confirm transactions.56
Mining is the decentralized process by which computers running the
Ethereum software confirm transactions through a “proof-of-work”
problem.57 Successful completion of the “proof-of-work” problem re-
sults in a new block being added to the blockchain.58 The mining pro-
cess involves confirming the validity of an Ether transaction, bundling
the transaction into a block, and inserting the block into the
blockchain.59 Once the block is inserted into the blockchain, the miner
ple Guide to the Ethereum Metropolis Upgrade, SQUAWKER (Oct. 2, 2017), https://
squawker.org/technology/a-simple-guide-to-the-ethereum-metropolis-upgrade/
[https://perma.cc/J2NW-4UCR].
49. What is Ether, supra note 6.
50. Exchange Cryptocurrency at the Best Rate, CHANGELLY, https://changelly.com/
exchange/BTC/ETH/1?ref_id=coinmarketcap (last visited Dec. 20, 2016) [https://per
ma.cc/Q7G8-YW4V].
51. What is Ether, supra note 6.
52. Jordan Tuwiner, How to Buy Ethereum / Ether Classic, BUY BITCOIN WORLD-
WIDE (July 13, 2017), https://www.buybitcoinworldwide.com/ethereum/buy/ [https://
perma.cc/PE39-VNZY].
53. See generally infra text accompanying notes 89–95.
54. Burge, supra note 2, at 1529.
55. Id.
56. History of Ethereum, supra note 38.
57. See Burge, supra note 2, at 1530; Ethereum (Ether) Mining, BITCOINMINING
.COM, https://www.bitcoinmining.com/ethereum-mining/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/T9WS-7YRZ].
58. What is Bitcoin Mining?, BITCOINMINING.COM, https://www.bitcoinmining.com
(last visited Sept. 18, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7QQG-KTC6].
59. Id.
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answers a “proof-of-work” problem, thereby confirming that the new
block was costly and time-consuming.60 This process ensures that the
Ether paid to a miner has been earned.61
Other than the initial presale, mining is currently the only method
to create new Ether, although it can be bought and sold on secondary
virtual currency markets.62 Furthermore, the hardware and electricity
costs required to mine are very expensive, thereby limiting the num-
ber of miners, as well as the amount of Ether paid for mining.63
When bundling the transaction into a block, the miner takes infor-
mation from two blocks and turns it into a mathematical formula
known as a “hash.”64 Each hash contains properties found in the pre-
vious block, which allows the new block to connect within the
blockchain.65 If a block is ever corrupted, or a fake transaction en-
tered by tampering with information already stored in a block, the
hash within a block would be incorrect, thereby preventing new blocks
from connecting to the blockchain.66 The failure to connect serves as
an alert of the fraudulent transaction, giving the miners the opportu-
nity to halt all future transactions and to protect the blockchain from
the effects of the fraudulent activity.67
With the introduction of Ethereum Metropolis, Ethereum began
switching from the “proof-of-work” system to a “proof-of-stake” sys-
tem.68 A “proof-of-stake” system requires miners to use their Ether as
collateral in verifying transactions.69 This switch will further secure the
blockchain by requiring miners to take a stake in the verification of
blocks and effectively move the entire process away from mining and
into validating transactions.70 Additionally, it will open up the valida-
tion process to those on the network who lack the funds and skill re-
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Charles Bovaird, What Investors Should Know Before Trading Ether,
COINDESK (May 8, 2016, 3:12 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/what-to-know-trading-
ethereum/ [https://perma.cc/NF68-JELU].
63. Danny Bradbury, Can Hobbyist Bitcoin Miners Still Make a Buck?, COINDESK
(Nov. 8, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/can-hobbyist-bitcoin-miners-still-
make-buck/ [https://perma.cc/Z253-TG47].
64. How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK (Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.coindesk
.com/information/how-bitcoin-mining-works/ [https://perma.cc/NZU8-9VN3].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Jim Manning, Proof-of-Work v. Proof-of-Stake Explained, ETHNEWS (Nov. 2,
2016, 8:25 PM), https://www.ethnews.com/proof-of-work-vs-proof-of-stake-explained
(last visited Dec. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/P5YQ-M4SE]; Prableen Bajpai, Ether-
eum To Adopt Proof-of-Stake, INVESTOPEDIA (May 1, 2017, 10:19 AM), http://www
.investopedia.com/news/ethereum-adopt-proofofstake/ [https://perma.cc/J49P-
DEZC].
69. Manning, supra note 68.
70. Id.
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quired to complete the “proof-of-work” problem, thereby increasing
the blockchain’s decentralization.71
D. Smart-Contracts
“What is the meaning and purpose of ‘security’? How does it relate to
the relationships we have? I argue that the formalizations of our rela-
tionships – especially contracts – provide the blueprint for ideal
security.”
—Nick Szabo, 199772
A smart-contract is essentially a computer program code capable of
facilitating, implementing, and enforcing agreements using blockchain
technology.73 Because the terms of the agreement are preprogrammed
and capable of self-execution,74 the program is decentralized and al-
lows for the elimination of third-parties generally needed to ensure
the agreement is executed and enforced.75
While traditional contracts are generally drafted by lawyers or
transacting parties themselves, computer programmers create smart-
contracts by using smart-contract development tools and program-
ming code.76 Like traditional contracts, the code sets out the rules for
the contract, the obligations of each party, and the benefits and conse-
quences that may result in various circumstances.77 The difference,
however, is that the programming code automatically executes when a
term within the contract is (or is not) satisfied.78
One of the greatest benefits of smart-contracts is the ability to self-
execute and self-enforce through the programming within the
software.79 Delays and failures to perform certain specified aspects of
the contract can be avoided. To provide context, the execution of con-
tracts dependent on external events, such as financial derivatives that
71. Id. (currently the computer hardware needed to complete the “proof-of-work”
problem is very expensive).
72. Nick Szabo, The Idea of Smart Contracts, NICK SZABO’S PAPERS AND CONCISE
TUTORIALS, http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/
Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net /idea.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2017) [https://perma.cc/C8F8-6TXR].
73. Smart Contracts Explained, BLOCKCHAIN TECHS., http://www.blockchaintech
nologies.com/blockchain-smart-contracts (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
7ZHB-DLR9].
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See MONETARY AND CAPITAL MKTS., LEGAL, AND STRATEGY AND POLICY
REVIEW DEP’TS, INT’L MONETARY FUND, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND BEYOND: INI-
TIAL CONSIDERATIONS (2016), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603
.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BU8-TXKW].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-2\TWL202.txt unknown Seq: 12 26-APR-18 11:42
416 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
are traded when reaching a specified price, will greatly benefit from
the decentralization of a smart-contract.80
Although the potential benefits of smart-contracts are significant,
they are also susceptible to noteworthy risk. When individuals invest
in organizations operated by a smart-contract, as discussed in Section
IV.A, it is often unclear what will come of the investment and what
level of risk is associated with the investment. This creates the poten-
tial for fraud and financial loss, which will be discussed in Section
IV.B.1.
IV. DISTRIBUTED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS
The idea of a rigid organization [sic] or corporation will evaporate
and left will be the true essence of human interaction patterns, policed
only by openness and information-theoretic mathematics . . . strict
legality of the emergent behavior will become increasingly less rele-
vant as it becomes drastically pluralistic and unpoliceable with no
entity, legal or otherwise, coordinating it or profiting from it.
—Gavin Wood, 201581
Smart-contracts operating on the Ethereum network allow for the
creation of a new concept known as Distributed Autonomous Organi-
zations (“DAOs”).82 The operational requirements and structure of
DAOs are built into a smart-contract through the codification of rules
and decision-making, thereby eliminating the need for traditional con-
tracts and documentation.83 The creation of a DAO results in a struc-
ture requiring no centralized control, such as officers or directors.84
David Seigel explained the concept most clearly:
A group of people write the smart contracts (programs) that will
run the organization. There is an initial funding period, in which
people add funds to the DAO by purchasing tokens that represent
ownership – this is called a crowdsale, or an initial coin offering
(ICO) – to give it the resources it needs. When the funding period is
over, the DAO begins to operate. People then can make proposals
to the DAO on how to spend the money, and the members who
have bought it can vote to approve these proposals.85
When an investor initially invests in a DAO, there is no indication
as to how or where their money will be spent.86 It is essentially a blind
80. Id.
81. Gavin Wood, Bazaar Services, ETHEREUM BLOG (Apr. 5, 2015), https://
blog.ethereum.org/2015/04/05/bazaar-services/ [https://perma.cc/ZKT3-2DLJ].
82. David Siegel, Understanding The DAO Attack, COINDESK (June 25, 2016, 4:00
PM), http://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-journalists/ [https://perma.cc/
DR8G-9CT3].
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
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investment.87 Following investment, all investors in the DAO can pro-
pose how the money should be spent, followed by a vote.88 If and
when a proposal is approved, a third-party service provider develops
the product or service.89
A. Crowdfunding
DAOs raise capital through a “crowdsale.”90 Basically, a crowdsale
is an Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) conducted on the day an organi-
zation is formed, or sometimes prior to the formation of the organiza-
tion.91 However, instead of the organization issuing stock in exchange
for money, DAOs issue what are called “equity tokens” (“tokens”).92
In order to purchase these tokens, investors must first convert a recog-
nized currency into Ether, and then use that Ether to purchase to-
kens.93 The governance of tokens, such as how many tokens may be
issued (compare to authorized shares),94  is built into the smart-con-
tract governing the DAO.95
Tokens, like stock, give the token holder a piece of control over the
organization.96 Token holders are entitled to revenue sharing or trans-
action fees, which can be compared to dividends in a traditional cor-
poration.97 Additionally, token holders generally have the right to
vote on proposals concerning how the organization’s money will be
used.98
To further illustrate the comparison of DAOs to corporations, an
organization’s founders issue themselves a pre-defined number of eq-
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See DAO, SLOCK.IT, https://web.archive.org/web/20160621022411/https://
slock.it/dao.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/GR3Z-5CMP] (noting
that token holders have the power to elect a new service provider based on the terms
written into the smart-contract).
90. See Demian Brener, On Tokens and Crowdsales: How Startups Are Using
Blockchain to Raise Capital, COINDESK (Aug. 20, 2016, 5:31 PM), http://www.coindesk
.com/tokens-crowdsales-startups/ [https://perma.cc/SF87-2ZPS].
91. See id.; see also Kickstart a Project with a Trustless Crowdsale, supra note 8.
92. Brener, supra note 90.
93. Andrew Hinkes, The Law of the DAO, COINDESK (May 19, 2016, 4:15 PM),
http://www.coindesk.com/the-law-of-the-dao/ [https://perma.cc/A99X-795L].
94. Authorized shares are the maximum number of common shares a corporation
may legally issue. The number of authorized shares must be included in the Articles of
Incorporation when the corporation is formed. Kesavan Balasubramaniam, What is
Authorized Stock?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/06/auth
orizedshares.asp  (last visited Dec. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/9H5P-YEPF].
95. Brener, supra note 90.
96. Id. Stockholders are owners of the company and therefore have certain rights
and control associated with that ownership. See Martin Tillier, What is a Dividend?,
NASDAQ (Aug. 20, 2013, 5:31 PM), http://www.nasdaq.com/article/what-is-a-dividend-
cm269103 [https://perma.cc/Z8EW-P2FJ].
97. Brener, supra note 90; see Tillier, supra note 96.
98. Brener, supra note 90.
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uity tokens when writing the smart-contract.99 This is comparable to
officers and directors issuing themselves a pre-defined number of
shares during the IPO process, also known as a “Direct Share” pro-
gram.100 However, unlike traditional IPO’s that are marketed to po-
tential significant investors—such as large banks—anyone, anywhere,
can invest in a DAO’s crowdsale, unless restricted by the smart-con-
tract.101 Therefore, these organizations are essentially allowed to act
as a corporation through stock issuance without complying with the
filing requirements or the contractual and tortious duties imposed on
a Corporation.102
B. “The DAO” and Its Breach
On April 30, 2016, slock.it, a German startup company, launched a
crowdsale for its organization called “The DAO,” not to be confused
with a DAO in general.103 During the twenty-eight-day crowdsale pe-
riod, The DAO raised a record breaking $150 million from over 11,000
members.104
Following The DAO’s crowdsale, a “recursive call” was found in the
smart-contract operating The DAO.105  A recursive call occurs when a
token holder sells their interest in a DAO by selling back tokens, in
exchange for Ether, and the account balance fails to update until the
account holder ends the transaction.106 Therefore, after a token holder
has sold all of his tokens for Ether, it is possible to continue selling
The DAO tokens in exchange for more Ether because the account
balance does not update until the entire transaction is complete.107 To
illustrate what could happen, imagine withdrawing $20 out of an
ATM.108 You only have $20 in your account, but after the cash is dis-
pensed the machine asks if you would like to make another transac-
tion.109 By clicking “yes,” you withdraw another $20.110 Although
99. Id.
100. Anna T. Pinedo & James R. Tanenbaum, Frequently Asked Questions About
Initial Public Offerings, MOFO JUMPSTARTER (2016), https://media2.mofo.com/docu-
ments/faq-ipos.pdf [https://perma.cc/86J7-YVBL].
101. Brener, supra note 90.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 110–113 (who is held accountable when
things go wrong? The Author encourages and invites others to research and write on
this topic).
103. See Siegel, supra note 82.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The DAO, The Hack, The Soft Fork and The Hard Fork, CRYPTOCOMPARE
(Nov. 18, 2016, 11:55 AM), https://www.cryptocompare.com/coins/guides/the-dao-the-
hack-the-soft-fork-and-the-hard-fork/ [https://perma.cc/4NHM-GVVZ].
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
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there is no money left in the account, this process could go on until the
account holder selects “no,” effectively ending the transaction.111
Although The DAO creators assured token holders that there was
no risk associated with this recursive call, voting was put on hold for
the more than fifty proposals submitted by members while the issue
was being addressed.112 However, on June 18, 2016, the recursive call
within The DAO’s smart-contract code was exploited resulting in the
loss of more than 3.6 million Ether—equivalent to over $50 million.113
The hacker executed a split proposal, which resulted in the payment
of extra Ether and the creation of a new child DAO, which was essen-
tially a new DAO created by the hacker to which the stolen Ether was
diverted.114 Furthermore, the split proposal gave the hacker control
over both the child DAO and the stolen funds.115 As Ether holders
learned of the attack, the price of Ether dropped from $20 to less than
$13.116
Following the loss of $50 million, the looming question was “what
can investors do to get their money back?” The Ethereum network
suggested, and after much dissent, implemented a hard fork in the
blockchain.117 Basically, the hard fork resulted in erasing all transac-
tions after the attack and creating a new blockchain that was identical
to the Ethereum blockchain prior to the attack.118 However, the
Ethereum network, nor The DAO creators, experienced any ramifica-
tions for the inadequately maintained software.119 Although some of
the stolen money was returned to defrauded investors, this hack is an
example of the risks associated with DAOs and the significant need
for regulation.120
In October 2016, the Ethereum network announced two additional
hard forks in the blockchain due to slow transactions and network
111. See id.
112. See Siegel, supra note 82.
113. See id.; Klint Finley, A $50 Million Hack Just Showed That The DAO Was All
Too Human, WIRED (June 18, 2016, 4:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/06/50-mil-
lion-hack-just-showed-dao-human/ [https://perma.cc/DKD5-HNUC].
114. Drew Hinkes, A Legal Analysis of the DAO Exploit and Possible Investor
Rights, BITCOIN MAGAZINE (June 21, 2016, 11:57 PM), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/
articles/a-legal-analysis-of-the-dao-exploit-and-possible-investor-rights-1466524659
[https://perma.cc/8WMF-3L8P].
115. Id.
116. See Siegel, supra note 82.
117. Charles Boovaird, Can Two Ethereum Markets Co-Exist, COINDESK (Aug. 21,
2016, 12:42 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/can-two-ethereum-markets-co-exist/
[https://perma.cc/9RXY-A5R9].
118. Id.
119. See Siegel, supra note 82.
120. See Michael del Castillo, Ethereum Executes Blockchain Hard Fork to Return
DAO Funds, COINDESK (July 20, 2016, 3:23 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/ethereum-
executes-blockchain-hard-fork-return-dao-investor-funds/ [https://perma.cc/BZ96-
CYYN].
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issues.121 Although they were not the result of another breach, they
were signs of major weaknesses in the network. Furthermore, a fourth
hard fork was completed in November 2016 to further secure the net-
work from potential attacks and to delete empty accounts left by the
initial attacker.122
C. The Recent Surge in the Use of Ethereum and DAOs
Prior to 2017, the concept of Ethereum was unheard of by most
people.  In the past year, however, with the increased use of
cryptocurrency and increasing value of Ether, knowledge and use of
the Ethereum platform has expanded.
Recently, a company called LocalCoinATM introduced Ethereum
support for its ATMs in Toronto, Canada.123 A similar ATM was in-
troduced in 2017 in San Mateo, CA, allowing users to convert their
fiat currency into Ether.124 In the future, these ATMs may allow a
user to vote on resolutions or purchase items.125
During the summer of 2017, post offices in Austria began offering
Ether in exchange for cash.126 Approximately 1,800 branches are of-
fering this service, and users are given a code to upload the purchased
Ether into the user’s digital wallet.127
More notably, following a meeting between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and Ethereum-founder Vitalik Buterin, Russian banks
have begun to use an Ethereum-based blockchain for payment trans-
actions.128 By mid-2018, banks intend to use the platform to record
mortgages.129
What does this mean for Ethereum in the U.S. market? Regulators
must pay attention to the usefulness of the blockchain and the grow-
ing popularity of cryptocurrency, meaning that regulators must do
121. Alyssa Hertig, So, It Looks Like Ethereum is Going to Have to Fork Again. . .,
COINDESK (Oct. 12, 2016, 10:55 PM), http://www.coindesk.com/so-it-looks-like-ether-
eum-is-going-to-have-to-fork-again/ [https://perma.cc/73JC-TLCM].
122. See JP Buntinx, Fourth Ethereum Hard Fork is Called Spurious Dragon,
NEWSBTC (Nov. 18, 2016, 2:15 PM), http://www.newsbtc.com/2016/11/18/fourth-
ethereum-hard-fork-called-spurious-dragon/; Hertig, supra note 121.
123. Jordan Pearson, Toronto Just Got Its First Ethereum ATMs, MOTHERBOARD
(Aug. 15, 2017, 10:05 AM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/7xxbwz/to-
ronto-just-got-its-first-ethereum-atms [https://perma.cc/K8MV-HHS4].
124. See First Ether ATM announced, SEBFOR, http://sebfor.com/first-ether-atm-an-
nounced/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/KR4A-JLBD].
125. Id.
126. Lester Coleman, Austrian Post Offices Sell Bitcoin, Ethereum and More for
Cash, CRYPTOCOINSNEWS (July 18, 2017), https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/post-of-
fices-in-austria-sell-cryptocurrencies-for-cash/ [https://perma.cc/8WWZ-J6B2].
127. Id.
128. Lester Coleman, Russian Bank Consortium Uses Ethereum-Based Ledger as
Government Signals Support, CRYPTOCOINSNEWS (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.crypto
coinsnews.com/russian-bank-consortium-uses-ethereum-based-ledger-as-government-
signals-support/ [https://perma.cc/BU73-Z6TY].
129. Id.
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their job—acknowledge the shift and regulate before Ethereum,
smart-contracts, and cryptocurrencies become commonly used items
capable of extreme misuse and fraud.
V. THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933, ISSUERS,
AND INVESTMENT CONTRACTS
Without doubt, certain aspects of DAOs will be beneficial to many
industries. However, given the current lack of enforced regulation,
they are also tools that companies may use to dodge securities laws
and commit fraud. Investors have the right to know what they are
investing in, regardless of the level of risk, and serious penalties are
imposed on entities that fail to provide investors with material
information.130
The Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) was enacted to
protect investors from misrepresentations, omissions, and fraud.131 In
furtherance of this purpose, the Securities Act requires issuers to dis-
close the risks of the business along with other information concerning
the securities. The means used to accomplish these goals include the
registration of securities.132 Before an issuer may offer to sell securi-
ties to investors, it must file a registration statement with the SEC.133
Otherwise, the issuer is in violation of the Securities Act.134
This Article argues that the tokens issued by DAOs are securities,
and therefore DAOs are issuers. An issuer of a security is defined as
“every person who issues or proposes to issue any security.”135 Issuers
may offer or sell many types of securities to investors, but the most
relevant type of security in the DAO context is an investment
contract.136
130. What We Do, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3MQK-5D59].
131. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml  (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) [https://per
ma.cc/ZL62-UE29].
132. Id.
133. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e(c) (Westlaw through Pub. L.
No. 115-90).
134. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml (last visited Mar. 10, 2017) [https://per
ma.cc/ZL62-UE29].
135. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(4), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(4) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 115-90).
136. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(a)(1) (Westlaw through
Pub. L. No. 115-90). (A security includes “any note, stock, treasury stock, security
future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided inter-
est in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege en-
tered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security’, or any certificate
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Based on the Howey Test established in S.E.C. Comm’n v. W.J.
Howey Co., a transaction may be characterized as an investment con-
tract when: 1) it involves an investment of money; 2) in a common
enterprise; 3) with a reasonable expectation of profits; 4) to be derived
solely from the efforts of others.137
A. Investment of Money
An investment of money means “the investor must have committed
his assets to the enterprise in such a manner as to subject himself to
financial loss.”138 Although an investor in a DAO uses Ether to make
such investment, there are many reasons why this investment should
still be classified as an “investment of money.”
First, money is defined as “something generally accepted as a me-
dium of exchange, a measure of value, or a means of payment.”139
Federal courts have held that cryptocurrency qualifies as money be-
cause it can be “exchang[ed] for ordinary currency, acts as a denomi-
nator of value, and is used to conduct financial transactions.”140
Therefore, Ether, a cryptocurrency, is money.
Second, investors in DAOs are committing their assets, in this case
Ether, to the risk of financial loss. Token holders may lose their full
investment if a DAO fails to engage in projects following a crowdsale
or if the projects pursued perform poorly.141 Some DAOs have ac-
knowledged this risk of loss and provided investors with risk
disclosures.142
Beyond the risk of financial loss, the essential characteristics of an
investment have been defined as the receipt of profits, shares in gain,
and acquiring an interest in the organization’s assets.143 Through reve-
nue sharing and transactions fees, token holders of a DAO are entitled
to the receipt of the organization’s profits and shares in gain.144 Be-
cause the receipt of profits and shares in gain are dependent on the
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guaran-
tee of, or warrant of right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.”)
137. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); David Bollier, Distributed
Collaborative Organisations: Distributed Networks & Regulatory Frameworks (Dec.
27, 2014), http://bollier.org/sites/default/files/misc-file-upload/files/DistributedNet
worksandtheLaw%20report,%20Swarm-Coin%20Center-Berkman.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/S9CH-ZUYB].
138. Majors v. S.C. Sec. Comm’n, 644 S.E.2d 710, 716 (S.C. 2007).
139. Money, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
money [https://perma.cc/3PPX-5Q4B] (last updated Dec. 3, 2017).
140. U.S. v. Faiella, 39 F. Supp. 3d 544, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); SEC v. Shavers, No.
4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. 2013).
141. Hinkes, supra note 93.
142. Id. (“The use of The DAO’s smart contract code and the Creation of [DAO
tokens] carries significant financial risk.”)
143. All Seasons Resorts v. Abrams, 497 N.E.2d 33, 37 (N.Y. 1986).
144. Brener, supra note 90.
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success of the organization, token holders have an interest in the or-
ganization’s assets.145
Therefore, by using Ether to purchase a DAO’s tokens, token hold-
ers are making an investment of money because they have committed
assets to the organization in a way that subjects them to the risk of
loss.
B. Common Enterprise
Through a crowdsale, DAO investors pool their money together
with the hope of a return on their investment following a successful
vote and implementation of a project, which is ultimately pursued by a
third-party service provider.146 Three tests have been established to
determine whether this activity constitutes a Common Enterprise:
– The Horizontal Commonality: exists when investors pool their
contributions and “the success of individual investors depends on
the success of the overall ventures.”147
– The Broad Vertical Commonality: exists when the investor’s prof-
its depend on the efforts of the promoter.148
– The Narrow Vertical Commonality: exists when the “investor’s
profits are tied to the manager’s profits.”149
The majority of circuit courts use the Horizontal Commonality test,
placing a significant amount of weight on the pooling of resources re-
sulting in the investors sharing the risks and benefits of the venture.150
Because DAOs are funded through a crowdsale and investors gener-
ally share the risks and benefits, the Horizontal Commonality test
would most likely be satisfied and a court would find that the DAO is
a Common Enterprise.
If the Broad Vertical Commonality or Narrow Vertical Commonal-
ity tests were applied, the Common Enterprise element of the Howey
Test may not be satisfied. The tests, respectively, require a showing
that the promoter is an expert and that the investors rely on that ex-
pertise, or that the investor’s success or failure have a direct correla-
tion with the success or failure of the promoter’s efforts.151 Therefore,
whether or not the Common Enterprise element of the Howey Test is
met will depend on how the DAO is presented to investors, whether
there is a showing of expertise, and whether there is a correlation of
profits and losses and the promoter’s efforts.
145. Id.
146. Hinkes, supra note 93.
147. Bollier, supra note 137.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Ryan Borneman, Note, Why the Common Enterprise Test Lacks a Common
Definition: A Look Into the Supreme Court’s Decision of SEC v. Edwards, 5 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 16 (2005), https://blj.ucdavis.edu/archives/vol-5-no-2/why-the-com-
mon-enterprise-test.html [https://perma.cc/6NZ2-BUMG].
151. Id.
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C. Expectation of Profits
The purpose of investing in a DAO is to fund future projects.152 In
return, the investors hope to receive dividends (in the form of revenue
sharing) or transaction fees.153 Many DAOs advertise to potential in-
vestors that the DAO will pursue projects that will provide a return on
investment.154 For example, The DAO marketed to its potential inves-
tors that “The DAO [ ] has the option to accumulate [invested] ETH
to support its growth, or redistribute it to [T]he [DAO token]
[h]olders as a reward.”155
Absent a hope of receiving profit from the investment, a transaction
is not subject to SEC regulations.156 Profits have been defined by the
court as “either capital appreciation resulting from the development
of the initial investment, . . . or a participation in earnings resulting
from the use of investors’ funds.”157 By participating in the crowdsale
and subsequently voting on proposed projects, investors are expecting
their investment to appreciate in value. Furthermore, the investors are
planning to participate in earnings through revenue sharing, resulting
from the use of their funds to pursue projects. Therefore, it is clear
that by investing in DAOs, investors are expecting to receive a profit,
or “capital appreciation resulting from the development of the initial
investment,” in return.158
D. Efforts of Others
The involvement of an investor in a DAO following the initial in-
vestment is limited to voting. If the investors had more involvement in
the management, they would be considered general partners.159 When
an investor uses his own efforts to increase the value of an investment,
it is not a security for purposes of the Securities Act, subject to limited
exceptions.160
When an investor contributes money to a DAO, he is relying on the
smart-contract code to manage the funds and the chosen third-party
service provider to pursue and complete the approved projects.161 The
152. Peter Van Valkenburgh, DAOs: The Internet is Weird Again, and These are the
Regulatory Issues, COINCENTER (June 2, 2016), https://coincenter.org/entry/daos-the-
internet-is-weird-again-and-these-are-the-regulatory-issues [https://perma.cc/4CJZ-
PA79].
153. Brener, supra note 90.
154. Hinkes, supra note 93.
155. Id.
156. United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See SEC v. Shields, 744 F.3d 633, 643–44 (10th Cir. 2014).
160. Exceptions to the general partner rule have been established to protect part-
ners in limited circumstances. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir.
1981).
161. SLOCK.IT, supra note 86.
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only involvement of the investor is voting on whether to approve a
project, and investors are not required to engage in voting.162 There-
fore, the investor is nothing more than a passive investor with voting
rights in the organization.
It could be argued that because the investors have voting control
over which projects to pursue, they are not relying on the efforts of
others and are therefore partners in the enterprise. If the investors are
in fact partners, U.S. courts and the SEC would make the presump-
tion that an investment in a DAO is not an investment contract.163
This presumption may be overcome, however, by showing one of the
following:
(1) An agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the
hands of the partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact dis-
tributes power as would a limited partnership; or (2) The partner is
so inexperienced and unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is
incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or venture pow-
ers; or (3) The partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager
that he cannot replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise
exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers.164
Although the investors in a DAO may have more power than a lim-
ited partner, and are therefore not solely relying on the efforts of
others, as a whole they lack general experience and knowledge in the
various projects proposed and are incapable of exercising their poten-
tial partnership powers. Because investors are dependent on the cre-
ators of the smart-contract, they cannot exercise meaningful power
over the partnership. The creators of the smart-contract, with no input
from the investors, have the power to create the terms of the contract
and how the organization will operate, as well as when voting may be
put on hold.165
E. SEC Release No. 81207
On July 25, 2017, prior to the publication of this Article, the SEC
issued Release 81207 (the “Release”).166 The Release follows an in-
vestigation of The DAO pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and confirms that tokens issued by The DAO
are securities.167 Although the SEC confirms that The DAO issued
unregistered securities, the Release states that no enforcement action
162. See Hinkes, supra note 93.
163. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422–23.
164. Id. at 424.
165. See supra text accompanying note 112.
166. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 17 SEC Docket 5 (July 25,
2017).
167. Id.
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would be taken against The DAO.168 The question though, is why not?
Part VII addresses the implications of enforcing the current registra-
tion requirements against DAOs and proposes an amendment to the
Securities Act.
VI. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CURRENT REGISTRATION
REQUIREMENTS
Prior to issuing securities, a company is required to conduct a finan-
cial audit and disclose information through registration.169 Depending
on the size of the issuance, the disclosure of this information can be
complex, costly, and time consuming.170 The company is required to
hire an underwriter, auditors, accountants, and attorneys.171 It is esti-
mated that the average cost of going public is $4.7 million.172 In addi-
tion to the cost of going public, companies are required to file annual
and quarterly reports, averaging $1.5 million per year.173
These costs are attributable to the filing of a registration statement
with the SEC.174 The registration statement requires the company to
disclose a myriad of information, including but certainly not limited to
risk factors, basic information about the business, information on the
company’s managers, and financial information.175
Some companies, however, are able to identify an exemption within
the securities laws, thereby allowing them to sell securities without
filing a registration statement. These exemptions require careful atten-
tion to detail, and in most cases, are unavailable to DAOs.
The two most common exemptions are private offerings and intra-
state offerings.176 Regulation D is the safe harbor rule for a private
offering, meaning that if a company decides to sell unregistered secur-
ities, compliance with the rule exempts the company from liability for
failure to register the securities.177 The rule limits the number of non-
accredited investors that may invest, limits on the offering amount,
and prohibits the company from soliciting investors.178 To comply with
168. Id.
169. Considering an IPO? & The Costs of Going and Being Public May Surprise
You, STRATEGY&, https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand_Consid
ering-an-IPO.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/T5EW-SANM].
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Fact Answers: Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/V8ZH-EDF5].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Fact Answers: Regulation D Offerings, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://
www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-regdhtm.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/5GH8-22MV].
178. Id.
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the intrastate offering exemption, the company must be a resident and
doing business within the state where the issuance occurs, and all in-
vestors must be residents of the same state.179 DAOs do not qualify
for either exemption because, currently, they do not determine
whether investors are accredited or residents of a particular state.
VII. THE FUTURE OF DAOS DUE TO THE EFFECTS
OF REGULATION
This Article argues that DAOs fall under SEC jurisdiction, which
has been confirmed by the SEC. However, enforcement of the securi-
ties laws, as currently written, will result in the ultimate failure of
DAOs.  By enforcing the current regulations, someone must be held
accountable for selling unregistered securities, and if someone is held
accountable, the organization cannot be autonomous—there must be
someone in charge and making the decisions.180 However, the capabil-
ities of the blockchain and smart-contract used to operate DAOs may
cause regulators to second-guess enforcing the costly registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act. Perhaps the SEC is aware of these
implications, as evidenced by their decision to not seek enforcement
actions against The DAO after acknowledging the issuance of unregis-
tered securities in Release No. 81207.181 For these reasons, this Sec-
tion of the Article proposes a change to the current registration
requirements of the Securities Act.
A. Registration Requirements for Issuers of Securities
The Securities Act states that “unless a registration statement is in
effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly . . . to make use of any means or instruments of transporta-
tion or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell
such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or other-
wise.”182 The process of registering a public offering is not only time
consuming, but also extremely expensive.183 Following the registration
of securities are periodic filing requirements, which are also extremely
179. Intrastate Offering Exemptions: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers,
U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/intrastate-of-
fering-exemptions-compliance-guide-041917.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/8R8C-U7PK].
180. An argument that would take this Article down a different path is that because
someone must be held liable, and because the investors are making some manage-
ment decisions, such as which projects to pursue, they are not investors but actually
partners within the organization. See Hinkes, supra note 93.
181. See supra note 166–168 and accompanying text.
182. The Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e(a)(1) (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 115-90) (2012).
183. The average expense for an IPO raising $0-50 million is $4.7 million. See Con-
sidering an IPO?, supra note 172.
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burdensome.184 Therefore, requiring a DAO to file a registration
statement prior to issuing securities raises multiple issues.
The crowdsale used by DAOs to raise their initial capital is gener-
ally conducted immediately following the formation of the DAO. Be-
cause the Securities Act requires registration prior to the issuance of
securities,185 a DAO could not conduct a crowdsale until after a regis-
tration statement is filed and becomes effective. This creates a detri-
mental problem for DAOs. Prior to the crowdsale, a DAO has neither
the time nor the funds to complete and file a registration statement,
effectively causing a Catch 22—a DAO cannot conduct a crowdsale
until a registration statement is effective, but it cannot afford to file a
registration statement until after a crowdsale (although many other
factors will still prevent its ability to file a registration statement even
if funding were not an issue).
The second problem with the registration requirements is the au-
tonomy of token holders. The pillar on which DAOs and smart-con-
tracts are built is anonymity. If the registration requirements of the
Securities Act were imposed on DAOs, it would require someone to
be held accountable for filing such registration statement, as well as
accountability for the accuracy of the information provided during re-
gistration. Identifying a responsible party would destroy anonymity.
Finally, it must be determined who is responsible for the filing. Be-
cause DAOs are decentralized, no single person is in control. There-
fore, does the responsibility fall on the creator of a DAO? Perhaps the
miners who are keeping the blockchain operational? Another argu-
ment is that the token holders should be responsible. They are, after
all, responsible for making all operational decisions for the DAO. Af-
ter determining who is responsible for filing the registration state-
ment, who is then responsible for certifying that the statements are
correct? It would seem illogical to put this burden on token holders
considering that, in most cases, investors are 1) generally not certified
public accountants or executive level officers who have the required
knowledge to make this certification; and, 2) the offering and sale of
securities occurs prior to the token holder’s existence. Therefore, per-
haps the strongest argument is that the responsibility should fall on
the creator of a DAO. This is the most plausible argument considering
this person writes the smart-contract and initiates the crowdsale; the
other players do not enter the game until after the crowdsale.
For the sake of argument, assume it is the responsibility of a DAO
creator to file the initial registration statement. Who is then responsi-
ble for filing periodic statements? At this point the DAO is under the
control of the token holders through their voting power. Therefore,
184. See id.
185. See The Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77e(a)(1) (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 115-90) (2012).
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does this responsibility fall on them? Perhaps the solution to the prob-
lem could be written into the smart-contract? Similar to the provision
designating a service provider, perhaps a third-party could be con-
tracted to ensure the registration requirements are met. If this is the
answer, who is responsible following a violation? The third-party? The
token holders? These are all questions that must be answered under
the current registration requirements and, again, the answers would
likely destroy the foundation of the DAO and, subsequently, the in-
trigue that has attracted many investors.
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is clear that many issues must be
resolved and the structure of the DAO must change under current
registration requirements. However, because of the structure of
DAOs, most of these issues cannot be resolved without destroying the
foundation of these organizations. DAOs cannot financially operate
without conducting a crowdsale, yet do not have the money to file a
registration statement until after the crowdsale. Furthermore, as dis-
cussed, the entire framework of the DAO, which is the reason these
organizations are appealing, would likely be destroyed following
registration.
B. Why Regulation is Necessary and Actions Taken by Congress
As previously mentioned, the potential for loss based on the nature
of the DAO is significant.186 Not only are investors exposed to the risk
of hackers and technological problems, they are also at risk of the
investment never returning a profit due to the lack of proposal ap-
proval. Beyond these uncontrollable risks is the looming question of
whether DAOs are actually decentralized. The creators, after all, have
the power to create and include any terms imaginable when writing
the smart-contract. Additionally, the Ethereum founders have the
power and control to cause a hard-fork in the system.187 While inves-
tors are free to accept these risks, the purpose of securities laws is to
ensure disclosures are made regarding the offering of securities prior
to investment. Most DAOs, specifically The DAO, have failed to make
these material disclosures.
Therefore, to ensure disclosure, regulation is necessary. Without
regulation, DAO creators may make material misstatements or omis-
sions, thereby misleading investors. The DAO is a prime example. As
previously discussed, The DAO told investors that there were no is-
sues with the smart-contract operating the DAO, but there was in fact
a recursive call located in the software, resulting in the exploitation of
The DAO and the loss of $50 million.188
186. See supra text accompanying notes 113, 116.
187. See Siegel, supra note 82.
188. See id.
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In September 2016, the U.S. House of Representatives acknowl-
edged the need for blockchain regulation, although the investment
risks of DAOs—nor DAOs in general—were specifically mentioned in
the Bill.189 The Bill also recognized the potential benefits of the tech-
nology and, with appropriate protections, stated a belief that policy
should encourage the development of the technology.190 The Bill calls
for “a national policy . . . [that] encourage[s] the development of tools
for consumers to learn and protect their assets in a way that maxi-
mizes the promise customized, connected devices hold to empower
consumers, foster future economic growth, [and] create new com-
merce and new markets.”191 Congress has acknowledged both the use-
fulness and potential dangers of blockchain technology. It is unclear
whether Congress is currently aware of or monitoring the use of
blockchain technology for the creation of smart-contracts and, specifi-
cally, DAOs. As of the date of the publication of this Article, Con-
gress has not moved forward with any policy proposals.
On a similar note, prior to the blockchain bill, Rep. Stockman (R-
TX) introduced a bill titled the “Online Market Protection Act of
2014.”192 This Bill would have prohibited, for a period of five years
beginning June 1, 2015, any regulation governing the “creation, use,
exploitation, possession, or transfer of any algorithmic protocols gov-
erning the operation of any virtual, non-physical algorithm or com-
puter source code-based medium of exchange (cryptocurrency).”193
Although introduced over three years ago, the Bill has not moved be-
yond the House of Representatives.194
C. Proposal for New Regulation
As previously discussed, Blockchain technology is on the congres-
sional radar.195Any legislation passed to regulate blockchains must
take into consideration the various methods in which the technology is
used, including smart-contracts and DAOs. Beyond blockchain regula-
tion, the current securities regulations must be amended. As the se-
curities laws are currently written, DAOs are issuers of securities
subject to the demanding requirements of the Securities Act, as ac-
knowledge by the SEC.196 This Article proposes that, in addition to
any regulations governing blockchains, which are beyond the scope of
this Article, a new exemption to securities registration be introduced.
This exemption must allow DAOs to operate in a decentralized and
189. See H.R. Res. 835, 114th Cong. (2016) (enacted).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. H.R. 5892, 113th Cong. (2014).
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. See supra Section VII.B.
196. See supra Section V; see supra note 167.
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autonomous manner, yet provide the protection of disclosure to
investors.
Congress has already acknowledged the usefulness of raising capital
through a crowdsale, and in response passed Title III of the JOBS
Act. Title III provides an exemption to registering securities offered
through a crowdsale, given that certain criteria are met.197 However,
the exemption in Title III, which drastically relieves a company of the
burdensome registration requirements, is still too taxing for the
unique nature of DAOs. Compliance with any of the current securities
regulations would restrict a DAO from operating solely through a
smart-contract as a decentralized, anonymous organization. For exam-
ple, Title III limits the issuance of securities to $1 million per 12-
month period.198 Limiting DAOs to such revenue restrictions would
make operations financially infeasible, and would decrease the ap-
pealing nature of DAOs. Furthermore, Title III requires issuers to
provide the name of both the issuer and the directors and officers.199
This requirement is impossible to satisfy due to the decentralized na-
ture of a DAO and the lack of directors and officers. If DAOs were
required to appoint directors and officers to comply with the statute,
followed by the release of such officers’ and directors’ names, ano-
nymity and decentralization would be destroyed.
To prevent the destruction of DAOs through the burdensome re-
quirements of registration, this Article proposes a new exemption to
regulation for the issuance of tokens through DAOs. The autonomy of
investors must be preserved. The exemption, therefore, must be care-
fully drafted to preserve anonymity and decentralization. Addition-
ally, limits on the issuance amount should be avoided. Currently, the
only method used by a DAO to raise capital is a crowdsale. Limiting
the amount of capital raised through the crowdsale would suffocate a
DAO and destroy the concept. Any exemption, however must include
two requirements: 1) a fiduciary duty must be placed on the creator of
a DAO; and, 2) all DAOs must make certain disclosures.
1. Responsibility for Required Disclosures
As previously discussed, DAOs are issuers of securities, and the Se-
curities Act requires such issuers to file a registration statement con-
taining specific disclosures.200 Through such disclosures, however, a
DAO is at risk of failure due to the loss of anonymity and decentrali-
197. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Rules to Permit
Crowdfunding (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html
[https://perma.cc/22JC-RQEL].
198. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302(b)(b), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(a)(6)(A)
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
199. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act § 302, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77d(d)(3) (Westlaw
through Pub. L. No. 115-90).
200. See supra Sections VI & VII.A.
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zation. To prevent the potential destruction of DAOs while ensuring
that investors are informed, this Article proposes that an exemption
be passed to relieve DAOs of the burdensome registration require-
ments. Through such exemption, a temporary fiduciary duty should be
imposed on the creator of a DAO to ensure certain disclosures are
made prior to the issuance of tokens.
Following the creation of a DAO, but prior to the crowdsale, only
one individual or entity has complete knowledge of, or the ability to
obtain knowledge of, all the provisions of the smart-contract code—
the creator of the DAO. The Ethereum website states: “an Owner [or
creator] . . . works like an administrator, CEO or a President.”201 The
creator has the power to write the terms within a smart-contract, and
the ability to identify potential problems within the code of the smart-
contract. Because of this combination of knowledge and power, the
creator of a DAO must bear the burden of making certain disclosures.
The Author acknowledges that such disclosures will require a cer-
tain loss of anonymity. The loss, however, is minimal and limited to
the creator of the DAO, which is already disclosed in some in-
stances.202 Still, the proposal that a fiduciary duty be placed on the
creator carries a significant level of responsibility, and therefore de-
serves justification.
First, the creator has the power to write the smart-contract code.
This allows the creator to determine, among other things, exactly how
the DAO will operate, who the initial third-party service provider will
be, how voting will occur, and how much voting power token holders
are given. Furthermore, the creator has the power to issue himself
equity tokens prior to the crowdsale. Token issuance, combined with
the power to write the terms of the smart-contract, gives the creator
the potential power to determine whether any future proposed
projects will be approved or denied. For example, if the creator issues
himself 51% of the total authorized tokens and includes a provision
requiring a majority vote in favor of a project for approval, the creator
has given himself complete control. Investors should know, prior to
investing, that a single token holder has majority control.
Second, the creator has the ability to detect problems within the
code.203 Absent the disclosure of a problem and the failure to correct
it, token holders are at risk of significant loss. Disclosure must be
made to 1) allow an investor the opportunity to make an informed
decision; and, 2) allow a token holder the opportunity to sell his to-
kens if he determines the risk is too high. This disclosure and ability to
make an informed investment decision is the premise of securities
laws.
201. How to Build a Democracy on the Blockchain, ETHEREUM, https://www.ether-
eum.org/dao  (last visited Sept. 26, 2017) [https://perma.cc/B9V7-YBKE].
202. See Siegel, supra note 82.
203. See id.
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Based on the unique position of the creator, combined with the
power and ability to access all relevant information pertaining to the
DAO, a duty to disclose information to potential investors and current
token holders must be imposed on the creator.
2. Required Disclosures
Although this Article proposes an exemption to the current regis-
tration requirements, new regulations must require the disclosure of
certain key information. Such information will provide investors with
the minimum knowledge needed to make an informed investment de-
cision. Though slightly burdensome, the limited disclosure require-
ments should be financially and administratively feasible for DAOs to
collect and disclose.
a. Disclosure of the Creator’s Name
An exemption to the current registration requirements must require
the disclosure of a DAO creator’s name. As previously discussed,
DAO creators should owe a fiduciary duty to investors.204 Therefore,
because the fiduciary duty requires the creator to disclose certain in-
formation, the SEC and investors must know the creator’s name. Re-
quiring the disclosure of the creator’s name allows an individual or
governmental entity to pursue a cause of action when an issue arises,
thereby ensuring the fiduciary duty of the creator is upheld. The ex-
emption, however, should be written to ensure that only the name of
the creator is required to be disclosed. Failure to carefully draft this
provision may result in the destruction of anonymity beyond what is
necessary.
b. Disclosure of the DAOs Purpose
Prior to investing, potential investors should be informed of the
purpose of the DAO and the types of projects it may be pursue. Regu-
lations, however, should not limit the possible purposes a DAO may
pursue. For example, if the purpose of a DAO is to pursue any varia-
tion of possible projects within a specific field, regulation should not
prevent such purpose, so long as that purpose is disclosed to the inves-
tor. Because of the decentralization of DAOs, and the ability to build
a DAO that allows investors to choose its direction, some DAOs may
not have a specific purpose at the time of the crowdsale. Such specific
purpose may later be determined by the investors.
Most DAOs, however, have an overarching, general purpose in
mind when created.205 Although the purpose may not be specific, the
204. See supra Section VII.C.1.
205. Examples may include maintaining travel records and documents on a
blockchain. See EthPassport, GITHUB, https://github.com/mdcuesta/EthPassport (last
visited Mar. 10, 2017) [https://perma.cc/5TQ2-6CP3].
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general idea must be disclosed. For example, the capabilities of the
selected third-party service provider may be limited to certain
projects, thereby limiting the types of projects that may be pursued, or
the smart-contract may be written in a manner that focuses on a gen-
eral type of project. Because capabilities of the third-party service
provider may be limited, or the terms within the smart-contract limit
what the DAO may do, investors must be informed of these specific
limitations and a broad “any lawful purpose” may not be given as the
DAO’s purpose.
The goal in requiring the disclosure of a DAO’s purpose is not to
protect the investor from making a bad investment decision, but to
ensure the investor is given the information needed to make an in-
formed investment decision. If given this information, the investor is
then responsible for deciding whether to move forward, regardless of
whether the investment decision is wise.
c. Disclosure of the Smart-Contract’s Terms
A DAO must be required to disclose all terms within the smart-
contract. Given the nature of the DAO, and the promise of decentrali-
zation, investors have a right to be informed about the smart-contract
terms. These terms control everything the organization may do, and
how those things will be done. For example, if the smart-contract in-
cludes a term requiring a supermajority vote for the approval of a
proposed project, the requirement must be disclosed to investors. A
supermajority vote will limit the number of projects approved,
thereby potentially limiting the return on investment. Additionally, if
the terms within the contract give the creator majority control of the
DAO, and majority control is required to approve or reject a project,
the investors have a right to know this information prior to investing.
Based on the terms of the contract, investors may ultimately be given
little to no voting power. Therefore, the terms of the smart-contract
must be disclosed to ensure investors are given the opportunity to
make an informed investment decision.
d. Third-Party Service Provider Disclosure
The third-party service provider written into the smart-contract
code must be disclosed to investors. Investors should be informed
about the individual or entity that will ultimately be responsible for
implementing projects, following approval by token holders. This dis-
closure allows the investor the opportunity to research the service
provider to determine their sustainability, reputation, and ability. For
example, an investor may choose to not invest if the purpose of the
DAO is to pursue projects that will promote sustainable energy, and
the third-party service provider is an expert in coal-mining projects.
For this reason, the name of the third-party service provider must be
disclosed prior to investing to allow the investor an opportunity to
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research the service provider and determine whether it can support
the projects projected to be pursued by the DAO.
e. Disclosure of Risks
Like a traditional corporation, DAOs should be required to disclose
all material risks associated with the DAO prior to the crowdsale. This
information, like other disclosures, gives the investor the opportunity
to make an informed investment decision.
A DAO must be required to disclose both the potential risks of a
DAO in general, as well as the risks specific to each DAO. General
risks may include the possibility of hacking or a project never being
approved, thereby preventing the investor from ever receiving a re-
turn on investment. Specific risks may include the risks associated
with the purpose of a DAO. For example, if the purpose of a DAO is
to pursue sustainable energy projects, the risks associated with sus-
tainable energy projects must be disclosed.
The purpose of regulation is not to prevent a DAO from pursuing a
certain type of project, but instead to inform the investor of the poten-
tial risks with such purpose prior to investing. If a DAO is overflowing
with potential risks, that is acceptable, so long as those risks are dis-
closed to the investor.
Initial disclosures of risks and other material information, however,
are insufficient. Comparable to the required 8-K filing for a traditional
corporation,206 DAOs must continuously disclose information that
may be material to an investor, thereby allowing the investor to con-
tinuously make informed investment decisions. For example, when the
recursive call was found in The DAO, investors should have been in-
formed of both the problem and the risk that The DAO may be
hacked. Instead, The DAO informed investors of the problem, but
misled investors into believing that their funds were safe. This failure
to disclose material information resulted in substantial losses for many
investors. Continuous disclosures will give the investor an opportunity
to make an informed decision and to take appropriate action regard-
ing the investment.
Responsibility for continuous disclosure is a potential issue. Unlike
prior to the crowdsale, the investors now have voting control over a
DAO and the creator is not necessarily the “person in control.” As
discussed later in the Article,207 the creator should be given the power
to shift this burden, although the terms of such shifting, prior to its
occurrence, must be disclosed to the investors.
206. Public companies are required to disclose any major events that may impact a
shareholder’s investment decision by filing an 8-K. See Form 8-K, U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersform8khtm.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2018) [https://perma.cc/FF5U-SHNH].
207. See infra Section VII.C.3.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\5-2\TWL202.txt unknown Seq: 32 26-APR-18 11:42
436 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
The Author acknowledges the financial barriers associated with risk
disclosures and welcomes discussion regarding how to ensure risks are
disclosed without subjecting DAOs to such burdensome cost
requirements.
f. Financial Disclosures
Along with the continuous disclosure of material information,
DAOs must be required to file annual financial reports. This informa-
tion should include, among other general financial disclosures: any
funds obtained through secondary crowdsales; the number of tokens
issued to the creator, investors, and miners; projects that have been
approved or denied and funds used to pursue approved projects; and
the funds used to pay the third-party service provider. This annual
reporting will keep investors informed about the projects being pur-
sued by the DAO and whether those projects are providing a return
on investment, as well as whether their token ownership has been
diluted.
3. Disclosures Following the Crowdsale
As noted in the previous Section, new regulations must require con-
tinuous disclosure throughout the life of a DAO. This presents a po-
tential problem and deterrent effect for the creator of a DAO. It is
unlikely that a creator will want to subject himself to the endless re-
sponsibility of reporting or the significant fiduciary duty associated
with the creation of a DAO. Therefore, the creator of a DAO should
be allowed to shift this responsibility to a third-party following the
initial crowdsale.
Similar to the third-party service provider, new regulations should
allow for the designation of a third-party who is responsible for all
required disclosures subsequent to the crowdsale. Just as the creator
has a fiduciary duty to investors during the initial disclosures, the
third-party must owe a fiduciary duty to investors.
The shifting of this duty presents two issues: 1) this type of third-
party provider who assumes responsibility for financial and risk disclo-
sures does not exist; and 2) because accepting this duty is extremely
risky, it is unlikely that individuals or businesses will step forward to
take on this role.
Given the opportunities blockchain and DAOs present, the Author
argues that allowing this burden to shift to a third-party opens the
door to a new industry. Although these third-parties do not yet exist,
blockchain did not exist a few years ago either. New regulations al-
lowing the creator to step away from the DAO and give control to
investors, who will then have control over the third-party, is a very
enticing prospect. Creators of DAOs will likely be willing to en-
courage the emergence of this new industry and pay fairly for the re-
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lief of reporting duties. The regulations and specific details of this new
third-party fiduciary are beyond the scope of this Article, but the Au-
thor wants to bring attention to the fact the possibility of burden-shift-
ing is an option for these new, complex organizations, and argues that
new regulations should allow for this option.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the risks associated with the smart-contracts and DAOs are
serious, both provide for the use of cutting-edge technology with the
potential for technological advancement in many industries.208 Trans-
actions that currently require the use of multiple intermediaries and
paper trails could be replaced by a much more efficient smart-con-
tract.209 Absent an applicable exemption, however, DAOs are cur-
rently subject to regulation under the Securities Act. Investors have a
right to full disclosure prior to making an investment, but the current
regulations regarding this disclosure will destroy the foundation on
which DAOs are built and the intrigue that pulls in new investors.210
Therefore, a new exemption to regulation must be created. This ex-
emption to regulation, however, must also prevent the DAOs from
making material omissions or misstatements. Otherwise, the investors
can easily be taken advantage of when deciding whether to invest.
Therefore, Congress must impose on the creator of a DAO a fiduciary
duty to disclose material information and require that certain informa-
tion unique to DAOs is disclosed. Additionally, limited disclosures
common to all public entities must be made to ensure investors have
the opportunity to make an informed investment decision. Finally,
Congress should consider the allowance of burden shifting following a
DAOs initial crowdsale, and encourage the creation of this new
industry.
208. See supra text accompanying note 20–24.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 24.
210. The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 131.
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